Permanent Mission of Uzbekistan in Geneva

04/09/2026

04/09/2026

Tashkent is consistently translating the common principles of the “Shanghai Spirit” into practical mechanisms for cooperation

Deputy Director of the ISRS Bakhtiyor Mustafaev on Uzbekistan’s Key Initiatives at the SCO Bishkek Summit

Deputy Director of the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under the President of Uzbekistan (ISRS), Bakhtiyor Mustafayev, commented at the request of a correspondent of the Dunyo IA, on the initiatives put forward by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit held in Bishkek on August 31–September 1:
The outcomes of the SCO Summit held in Bishkek, which was attended by President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev, are now being widely discussed in the international media and expert community. In this regard, we would like to ask: what place does the SCO occupy in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy, and why does Tashkent attach particular importance to this platform?
— For Uzbekistan, the SCO is not a situational diplomatic format, but one of the key areas of its foreign policy. In 2001, Uzbekistan became one of the founding members of the Organization. The Executive Committee of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure is located in Uzbekistan, while Central Asia is officially recognized as the geographical and strategic core of the SCO.
Through this platform, Tashkent addresses three closely interconnected objectives: strengthening regional security, expanding the economic connectivity of the continent, and pursuing an open, non-aligned and multi-vector foreign policy.
Uzbekistan’s commitment is reflected not only in political statements, but also in the consistent promotion of practical initiatives. In 2018, at the initiative of the President, the SCO leaders adopted a Joint Appeal to Youth. In Samarkand in 2022, the Uzbek side raised issues of transport connectivity, food security and the reconstruction of Afghanistan. In 2023, Uzbekistan proposed the Code of Good-Neighbourliness, Trust and Transboundary Partnership. In 2024–2025, it put forward initiatives aimed at strengthening SCO unity and proposed the concept of a Common Transport Space.
The current proposals continue this line: Tashkent is consistently translating the common principles of the “Shanghai Spirit” into practical mechanisms for cooperation.
You noted that Uzbekistan does not limit itself to political statements and regularly puts forward practical initiatives within the SCO. The Bishkek Summit was no exception: the President proposed developing a vision for “SCO–2040”. Why is such a long-term document needed if the Organization already has a Development Strategy through 2035?
— The Strategy through 2035 primarily addresses the question of what the Organization should accomplish over the medium term. The “SCO–2040: A Space for Common Development” vision is intended to address a more fundamental question: what should the SCO become after this strategy has been implemented? The aim is to move from a set of sector-specific programs toward a common model of an interconnected space, with the movement of investment, technology and knowledge, joint production, and direct links between regions and businesses.
Such a long-term horizon is justified by the scale and diversity of the Organization. The SCO countries account for around 42% of the world’s population and approximately 36% of global GDP in purchasing power parity terms. At the same time, their mutual trade, according to various estimates, has only recently approached $1 trillion. A comparison of these figures highlights the main gap: the SCO’s political and demographic weight still significantly exceeds the depth of its internal economic cooperation.
One of the most practical initiatives presented by the President of Uzbekistan at the Bishkek Summit was the creation of an SCO Industrial Cooperation Map. How can this mechanism turn the Organization’s vast geographical and economic scale into real cross-border production chains?
— The main challenge today is not so much a lack of joint projects as the fragmented nature of information and differences in regulatory conditions. In Uzbekistan alone, more than 1,500 joint projects with SCO countries are currently being implemented. At the same time, businesses still find it difficult to obtain, in one place, systematic information on available industrial sites, raw material resources, potential suppliers, support measures, logistics opportunities and markets across all ten member states. In this context, the SCO Industrial Cooperation Map could serve as a single digital tool, making it easier to identify partners and reducing transaction costs in the preparation and coordination of joint projects.
Its practical impact will depend on the content of the platform. If it includes a verifiable registry of special economic zones, available production capacities, localization requirements, transport tariffs and investment incentives, businesses will be able to build cross-border value chains rather than remain limited to trading raw materials and finished products. This is particularly important for small and medium-sized enterprises, which do not have the resources of large corporations to independently study ten different jurisdictions.
Continuing with the economic agenda of the Bishkek Summit, the President of Uzbekistan called for moving from discussions of general principles to the practical launch of the SCO Development Bank. Why does the Organization need its own financial institution, and how can it avoid becoming another bureaucratic structure?
— The SCO has many transport, energy and digital initiatives, but it does not have its own mechanism for turning them into a pipeline of well-prepared and financeable projects. The Interbank Consortium coordinates banks, but it does not replace a development institution with common criteria for project appraisal, co-financing and monitoring. A development bank could fill precisely this institutional gap, particularly when it comes to multinational projects whose benefits and risks are shared among several countries.
Uzbekistan’s proposal is significant because it links the launch of the bank not to the creation of an administrative structure, but to the formation of a portfolio of mature projects in transport, energy, industry and digital infrastructure. This is the right sequence: first, identify the projects, their costs, expected impact and sources of repayment; then determine the bank’s capital and institutional structure. To ensure reliability, the bank would need a transparent procurement policy, independent project assessment, debt sustainability analysis, and the ability to provide financing in different currencies.
A separate part of the President of Uzbekistan’s address in Bishkek focused on artificial intelligence. Why did Tashkent propose creating an Open Multilingual SCO Data Corpus rather than a single language model, and what practical value could it bring to the countries of the Organization?
— Modern artificial intelligence depends not only on computing power, but also on the availability of high-quality data. Most of the languages spoken across the SCO space are significantly underrepresented in global digital datasets compared with English and Chinese. As a result, AI systems have a weaker understanding of local legal, scientific and cultural terminology, while governments and businesses are often forced to rely on products trained on foreign linguistic and contextual data.
An open data corpus could become shared basic infrastructure: standardized texts, speech and translations in the languages of the member states would enable the development of machine translation, education, healthcare, public services and e-commerce applications. This would be a more realistic first step than creating a single SCO model. Each country would be able to develop its own solutions using a compatible shared dataset, while ensuring compliance with relevant legal requirements.
The key conditions would be the protection of personal data, respect for copyright, quality control, and equal representation of the languages of all member states.
Transport connectivity was given considerable attention at the Bishkek Summit. The President of Uzbekistan proposed establishing a Council for the Integration of Railway Systems of the SCO Member States. What practical problems should this Council address, and what would its creation mean for Uzbekistan and Eurasian transit more broadly?
— New railway lines alone do not create a seamless corridor. Differences remain at the borders in technical standards, track gauges, tariffs, electronic document formats, train schedules and control procedures. The Council is intended to serve as a permanent mechanism for coordinating precisely these “connections” between different systems. For Uzbekistan, as a doubly landlocked country, the predictability of transit across several states is no less important than the length of the route itself.
Its practical agenda could include through-tariffs and coordinated schedules, mutual recognition of electronic waybills, synchronization of border-crossing operations, digital cargo tracking, and coordination of investment in bottlenecks. This would help connect the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway with routes through the Caspian Sea, the North–South Corridor, and prospective routes toward South Asia.
The situation in Afghanistan was also an important part of the agenda of the Bishkek Summit. The President of Uzbekistan called for the resumption of regular SCO dialogue with Afghanistan. Why is such dialogue particularly important now, and what role could a restored SCO–Afghanistan Contact Group play?
— The logic behind the proposal is pragmatic: the absence of dialogue does not eliminate threats; rather, it reduces the ability of neighboring countries to manage them. Afghanistan is directly adjacent to the SCO space, and developments in the country have a direct impact on risks related to terrorism, drug trafficking, illicit arms trade, migration and water issues. Isolating the country could only deepen the economic crisis, expand the social base for radicalization and strengthen the shadow economy. At the same time, regular contacts do not imply automatic recognition of the current authorities; they provide a tool for setting conditions, monitoring their implementation and addressing specific security issues.
In the long term, the best way to strengthen security around Afghanistan is to create legitimate sources of income, jobs and sustainable economic interdependence with neighbouring countries within Afghanistan itself.
In 2025, Afghanistan’s foreign trade approached $13.9 billion. Due to disruptions along the Pakistani route, part of the trade flows has already been redirected through Iran, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. If these links are channelled into legitimate trade, energy, transport and infrastructure projects, greater economic engagement can help reduce the space for extremism and smuggling.
To conclude our discussion of the initiatives put forward at the Bishkek Summit, we should also mention the President of Uzbekistan’s proposal for a program on preserving traditional arts and intangible cultural heritage for 2028–2030. Why does the SCO need a separate program in this area, and what practical results could it deliver?
— The SCO brings together states with different political systems and interests, so its long-term cohesion cannot rely solely on intergovernmental agreements. Traditional arts, crafts, music, oral traditions and cultural festivals create horizontal ties between societies and help shape a shared cultural space while preserving national identities and differences.
In practical terms, the program could include joint registries and digital archives, restoration and research projects, festivals, exchange programs for traditional artisans, youth training, and cultural tourism routes. For Uzbekistan, this would serve both as an instrument of cultural diplomacy and as a means of supporting regional economies: traditional crafts contribute to employment, small businesses and cultural tourism.
During his visit to Bishkek, the President of Uzbekistan also took part in the “SCO Plus” meeting, which focused on the role of the United Nations in shaping a fairer multipolar world order. How could the model of cooperation proposed by Uzbekistan between the UN, regional organizations and individual states improve the effectiveness of international cooperation without creating new dividing lines? And what practical role could the “SCO Plus” format play in this process?
— The central message of the address is that the emergence of a multipolar world should not lead to the weakening of universal international institutions or to the creation of competing geopolitical blocs. The UN should retain its central coordinating role and uphold common principles of international cooperation, while regional organizations should complement its efforts by adapting global decisions to the specific conditions, capacities and needs of individual regions. Such an approach would combine the universal legitimacy of the UN with the practical capabilities of regional organizations, thereby strengthening the effectiveness and manageability of the international system.
It is precisely in this context that the “SCO Plus” format is proposed as a bridge between states, regional organizations and global institutions. It could serve as a platform for coordinating various initiatives in areas such as sustainable development, advanced technologies, climate adaptation, education, healthcare and youth empowerment. The proposed Network of Regional Organizations would help systematize such cooperation, facilitate the exchange of experience and jointly promote solutions within the UN framework. An open bank of interregional projects and technologies, in turn, would help translate political agreements into concrete programs that contribute to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.
At the same time, Uzbekistan links the effectiveness of international cooperation to tangible results for states, businesses and citizens: greater access to markets, the development of cross-border corridors, increased investment and the wider use of modern technologies. The proposal to transform “SCO Invest” into a permanent platform is aimed at addressing precisely this objective.
At the same time, the establishment of the “SCO Plus” Forum of Cultures and Civilizations in Khiva is intended to give cooperation a broader societal and humanitarian foundation. In this way, Tashkent is proposing a model of open multipolarity in which the strategic autonomy of states is strengthened not through isolation, but through greater connectivity, complementarity of initiatives, and an expansion of points of contact between countries and regions.

04/09/2026

Uzbekistan and the Republic of Korea: From Investment Partnership to Technological Cooperation

Uzbek–Korean relations are entering a new stage of development. While trade, investment and equipment supplies previously formed the foundation of bilateral ties, the emphasis is now shifting towards deeper industrial and technological cooperation.
The development of joint production and technology chains, the localisation of high-tech manufacturing, the advanced processing of critical mineral resources, and human capital development are emerging as key areas of bilateral cooperation. This trajectory is aligned with the long-term priorities of both countries.
The Republic of Korea seeks to diversify its sources of raw materials and enhance the reliability of supply. Uzbekistan, in turn, is interested in expanding domestic resource processing, adopting advanced technologies, and increasing the value added generated within the country. The complementarity of these objectives provides a basis for moving from predominantly investment-based cooperation towards a comprehensive industrial and technological partnership.
In 2025, bilateral trade amounted to approximately $1.8 billion. In August 2026, the two governments established a joint working group tasked with increasing annual trade turnover to $4 billion in the near term.
Investment cooperation has assumed an even greater scale. The cumulative volume of Korean investment attracted to Uzbekistan’s economy has exceeded $10 billion, including approximately $8 billion in foreign direct investment. The presence of Korean businesses is also expanding. Today, around 1,000 enterprises with Korean capital operate in the country, compared with 359 in 2019.
The investment base accumulated over the years has been translated into a number of major projects. The most significant is the Uz-Kor Gas Chemical joint venture, valued at approximately $4 billion — the largest investment project in the history of bilateral relations. The enterprise produces polyethylene, polypropylene and commercial gas for the domestic market and export.
The automotive industry occupies a prominent place in bilateral cooperation. In partnership with Kia Corporation, the ADM Jizzakh plant manufactures a broad range of vehicles using semi-knock-down assembly. Enterprises within the UzAuto Components network manufacture components for UzAuto Motors vehicles, including air-conditioning systems, seats, stamped parts and plastic components.
Industrial cooperation also extends to the textile sector. Posco International Group enterprises in the Fergana and Bukhara regions process cotton fibre and export high-quality yarn and fabrics to European and Asian markets.
Cooperation is also developing in the pharmaceutical industry. At the Tashkent Pharma Park cluster, Korean companies are participating as investors and technology providers in the manufacture of pharmaceutical products in accordance with international Good Manufacturing Practice standards.
The broadening sectoral scope of cooperation is creating the conditions for a transition from individual investment projects to sustainable production linkages between enterprises in the two countries.
Why Cooperation Is Acquiring a New Quality
Deeper industrial and technological cooperation is being driven by changes in the global economy. Geopolitical uncertainty, trade restrictions and the restructuring of global supply chains have increased the importance of economic security.
This issue is particularly relevant for the Republic of Korea. Its leading industries — electronics, semiconductors, automotive manufacturing and battery production — depend on stable supplies of raw materials, materials and components.
The country ranks third globally in electronics manufacturing and is a leader in the memory-chip segment. It accounts for approximately 13–15 per cent of the global semiconductor market. The Republic of Korea is also among the world’s seven largest automobile manufacturers and the three global leaders in battery technology.
The reliance of its key industries on imports is prompting Seoul to broaden its economic partnerships and diversify its supply base for raw materials, processed materials and components. Against this backdrop, Central Asia is assuming greater importance as a resource-rich region seeking to advance its industrial modernization.
At the same time, Uzbekistan is placing greater emphasis on the quality of incoming investment. At the present stage, not only the volume of investment but also its technological impact is becoming increasingly important. The principal focus is on establishing new production facilities, expanding domestic processing, strengthening export capacity and training qualified personnel.
The convergence between the Republic of Korea’s need for reliable sources of raw materials and Uzbekistan’s aspiration to develop their advanced processing lends particular importance to cooperation in critical minerals.
From Raw-Material Trade to Value Chains
Uzbekistan possesses reserves of copper, tungsten, lithium, molybdenum, zinc and other strategically important resources. For the Republic of Korea, these resources are of interest as an important component of the raw-material base for high-tech industries.
For Tashkent, the priority is not simply to expand raw-material exports, but to progressively deepen their processing within the country. In this regard, a promising model would integrate resource extraction, processing, the manufacture of intermediate products and their subsequent industrial use into a single value chain.
This approach serves the interests of both sides. It would enable the Republic of Korea to diversify its sources of strategic raw materials and enhance supply-chain resilience. Uzbekistan, meanwhile, would be able to expand processing, master new technological processes and increase the share of high-value-added products.
The localisation of individual stages of the technological cycle in Uzbekistan is becoming particularly important. The greater the number of production operations carried out within the country, the more substantial the benefits for industry, employment and the training of national specialists.
Thus, the traditional model of cooperation, based primarily on supplies of raw materials and equipment, is gradually being complemented by a model centred on the joint creation of value added.

Technology, Financing and Human Capital
The development of production chains requires not only investment, but also technology, long-term financing and qualified personnel. The combination of these elements could become one of the principal strengths of the Uzbek–Korean partnership.
The financial and institutional framework required to deepen cooperation is already taking shape. Under the partnership with the Republic of Korea’s Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF), the ceiling for concessional financing available to Uzbekistan has been raised to $2 billion. The funds are being channelled into projects in digitalisation, healthcare, education and infrastructure.
Additional opportunities are provided by the Export-Import Bank of Korea. It helps finance the acquisition of Korean industrial equipment through credit lines extended to Uzbek banks. Export credit insurance mechanisms also facilitate the mobilisation of bank financing for joint initiatives.
These financial instruments are complemented by expanding technological cooperation. In August 2026, the two sides intensified their engagement in artificial intelligence and digital transformation. With the support of the National Information Society Agency of the Republic of Korea (NIA), cooperation is developing in digital government, data standardization and the introduction of AI solutions.
For Uzbekistan, this work is important not only in terms of the digitalization of individual sectors. The standardization of production data, automation and the application of artificial intelligence can increase productivity and lay the groundwork for the development of modern smart manufacturing.
Human capital development remains an equally important component. Branches of four South Korean universities operating in Uzbekistan — Yeoju, Inha, Bucheon and Kimyo International University — train engineers, IT specialists and technologists for emerging sectors of the economy.
This educational dimension is complemented by the organised employment of Uzbek specialists in the Republic of Korea under the Employment Permit System (EPS). Employment at Korean industrial and shipbuilding enterprises enables them to acquire practical skills and become familiar with modern manufacturing practices.
The significance of this mechanism is gradually extending beyond labour mobility. If the acquired competencies are used effectively, it could become an important channel for transferring industrial expertise and professional knowledge.
The combination of financial instruments, technology and human capital development is creating the foundation required for deeper industrial cooperation.
From Bilateral Partnership to a Regional Dimension
The integration of Uzbek–Korean cooperation into the broader agenda between the Republic of Korea and Central Asia opens up additional opportunities.
The first summit between the Republic of Korea and the five Central Asian states is scheduled to take place in Seoul on 16–17 September 2026. The new format reflects Seoul’s growing interest in the region as a promising area for industrial, technological and resource cooperation.
This creates additional opportunities for Uzbekistan. The country possesses a sizeable domestic market, considerable demographic potential, a substantial resource base and a developing industrial sector. Its accumulated experience of cooperation with Korean businesses and financial institutions constitutes another significant advantage.
Taken together, these factors enable Uzbekistan to position itself as one of the leading platforms for the Republic of Korea’s industrial and technological cooperation with Central Asia.
The consistent development of production chains, localisation of technologies and training of qualified personnel could make Uzbek–Korean cooperation a notable example of the transition from an investment partnership to industrial and technological cooperation in Central Asia.
Chief Research Fellow at the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies (ISRS) under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan (ISRS), Doctor of Economics
Dmitry Trostyansky

04/09/2026

Uzbekistan – Serbia: A New Geography of Industrial Cooperation

A deeper model is beginning to take shape in Uzbek-Serbian economic relations, based on companies’ mutual access to each other’s markets. The Uzbek side is exploring participation in infrastructure projects in Serbia, while Serbian partners are considering localization, contract manufacturing, and the placement of orders in Uzbekistan. In this way, trade relations are being complemented by investment and production projects capable of giving cooperation a more sustainable character.

The economic logic behind this rapprochement is largely determined by the geographical position of the two countries. Serbia is in close proximity to the major markets of Central and Southeastern Europe and benefits from an extensive network of trade agreements. Uzbekistan is consistently expanding its industrial base and deepening localization in Central Asia. This combination creates favorable conditions for projects in which the partner’s market serves as a platform for production and investment, followed by access to neighboring markets.

Existing trade already outlines the sectoral foundation for cooperation. Uzbekistan supplies Serbia with food, textile, and chemical products, while Serbian exports include industrial equipment, machinery, metal products, and other goods for production purposes. The greatest potential lies in segments where supplies can be further developed through production specialization and joint investment.

The development of transport connectivity between Central Asia and Europe is increasing the importance of the Serbian route. Serbia is considered a potential European link of the Middle Corridor, or Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. Increasing the reliability and predictability of transportation reduces logistical constraints for businesses and improves the economics of projects targeting both Central Asian and European markets.

Against this background, cooperation in the railway sector is particularly significant. The sides are exploring a joint project for the construction of approximately 200 kilometers of railway infrastructure in Serbia. For Uzbekistan, the significance of this initiative goes far beyond a single infrastructure project. It provides an opportunity to bring to the European market the expertise accumulated in railway construction, engineering, and the implementation of major transport facilities. This expands the country’s export potential through engineering and construction services and gives national companies an opportunity to gain experience in implementing projects within the European business and regulatory environment.

In industry, the transition to more sophisticated forms of cooperation is taking place in several formats. In light industry, the placement of orders from Serbian brands at existing Uzbek production facilities is being considered. In pharmaceuticals, contract manufacturing of medicines in cooperation with Hemofarm and Galenika is being explored, along with local production in cooperation with the Torlak Institute. In mechanical engineering and electrical engineering, the focus is on the localization of metal components and the assembly of electric motors. This agenda is complemented by initiatives in the chemical industry and small and medium-sized hydropower.

These formats reflect different levels of enterprise involvement in joint value chains. The placement of orders makes it possible to utilize existing production capacities and establish links with international brands. Contract manufacturing raises requirements for technologies, standards, and quality control. Component localization brings more complex operations into the country and generates demand for local suppliers. In this way, commercial ties gradually create a foundation for sustainable production specialization. The mutually beneficial nature of cooperation is also evident in construction.

Alongside joint efforts to develop railway projects in Serbia, the involvement of Serbian contractors in major urban development projects in Uzbekistan is also being considered. Each side has the opportunity to apply its own experience in the partner’s market and expand the geographical reach of its national businesses.

At this stage, the institutional framework is of particular importance. The agreements on the mutual promotion and protection of investments and on economic cooperation that have entered into force provide a legal framework for long-term investment and systematic sectoral cooperation. Their practical value lies in supporting the initiatives already identified — from determining participants and developing financing models to their direct implementation.

The contours of the next stage are therefore already sufficiently clear: infrastructure services in the European market, the integration of Uzbek enterprises into international production chains, the development of more sophisticated technological operations within the country, and mutual participation of businesses in major projects. This is creating a deeper structure of relations in which trade is extended through investment and industrial cooperation.
The key task now is to consistently transform the established portfolio of initiatives into operational projects. Their implementation will make it possible to turn the geographical position of the two countries into a practical economic resource: for Uzbekistan, to expand the activities of national businesses in the European market; and for Serbia, to develop a long-term presence in the industrial space of Central Asia.